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THE VALIDITY OF PENNSYLVANIA'S TAXATION OF
NET GAINS DERIVED FROM DISPOSITIONS
OF PROPERTY
The Pennsylvania Legislature passed a personal income tax act
on August 31, 1971.1 The effect of this act was made retroactive
to June 1, 1971. A previous act, passed March 3, 1971, taxing per-
sonal income was declared unconstitutional due to lack of uni-
formity.
2
Although the legislature surmounted the uniformity problem
with the new income tax act by applying a flat-rate tax, several
other constitutional considerations were raised. This Comment
will consider those constitutional problems which relate to taxa-
tion of net gains resulting from the exchange of property. The
following attacks on the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's taxa-
tion of capital gains are presented: the patent ambiguity in the
language of the statute; the vagueness of the act; the narrow and
broad retroactivity arguments.
I. THE STATUTORY SECTION CONSIDERED
The following statutory language concerning the taxation of
capital gains has been enacted by the Pennsylvania Legislature:
There is hereby imposed an annual tax to be paid by resi-
dent individuals, estates or trusts at the rate of two and
three-tenths per cent on the privilege of receiving each
of the classes of income hereinafter enumerated ... 3
(3) Net gains on income from disposition of property.
Net gain or net income less net losses derived from the
sale, exchange, or other disposition of property, including
real or personal, whether tangible or intangible, but
only to the extent that the amount of such net gain or
income exceeds the taxpayer's actual or attributed base as
determined in accordance with accepted accounting princi-
ples and practices.
4
II. THE PATENT AMBIGUITY IN THE LANGUAGE
The general understanding of net gain is selling price less the
1. Act of August 31, 1971, ACT No. 93, P.N. 1786.
2. Act of March 4, 1971, AcT No. 2, P.N. 560, declared unconstitu-
tional by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Amidon v. Kane, 444 Pa. 38,
279 A.2d 53 (1971).
3. Act of August 31, 1971, AcT No. 93, § 302(b), P.N. 1786. The
same provision for the taxation of capital gains was incorporated in the
Act of March 4, 1971.
4. Act of August 31, 1971, ACT No. 93, § 303 (3), P.N. 1786.
basis of the property.' However, in the language of the new
Pennsylvania income tax act the Pennsylvania Legislature declared
that such net gains will be taxed "only to the extent that the
amount of such net gain or income exceeds the taxpayer's actual
or attributed base."6 A literal application of this language yields
a taxable amount only in situations in which the taxpayer's base
is less than one-half of the selling price. For example, if the tax-
payer's base were five hundred dollars and the selling price were
eight hundred dollars the net gain would be three hundred dol-
lars. However, since such net gain does not exceed the taxpay-
er's base, no taxable amount is realized. Had the base in the ex-
ample been three hundred dollars a taxable amount of two hun-
dred dollars would result-the extent by which the net gain of
five hundred dollars exceeds the base of three hundred dollars.
7
It seems likely this result was not intended by the Pennsyl-
vania Legislature. The burden of ascertaining the Legislature's in-
tention will be placed in the courts, which will look to the Penn-
sylvania Statutory Construction Act for guidance with regard to
the intent of the Legislature when interpreting the statute. The
Statutory Construction Act states:
When the words of a law are clear and free from all
ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under
the pretext of pursuing its spirit.
When the words of a law are not explicit, the inten-
tion of the Legislature may be ascertained by considering
among other matters-(l) the occasion and necessity for
the law; (2) the circumstances under which it was en-
acted . . . (5) the former law, if any, including other laws
upon the same or similar subjects; (6) the consequences
of a particular interpretation. .... .
Thus, if the words are "free from all ambiguity" the spirit of the
law will not prevail at the expense of the literal meaning, since
the Act additionally states that legislative intent is relevant to in-
terpretation only "when the words of a law are not explicit."
The Pennsylvania courts are unlikely to uphold the statutory
construction espoused here, that only net gain in excess of twice
the base is taxable, however. To defeat this apparently clear
interpretation the court must find an ambiguity in the statute.
A finding of latent ambiguity in the capital gains section of the
Pennsylvania Income Tax Act could be founded on any of the fol-
lowing premises: (1) the absurd result itself makes the section
ambiguous; (2) legislative intent should always be considered in
5.. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1001 (a), § 1012, § 1016.
6. Act of August 31, 1971, ACT No. 93, § 303 (3), P.N. 1786.
7. Sale price - base = net gain. Taxable net gain results only if
net gain exceeds base. For this to occur sale price must be more than
twice base.
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 551 (1969).
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construing a statute; (3) the section of the statute reading "but
only to the extent that"9 is itself ambiguous and could be read
"but only in instances in which."
Once the statutory section is declared ambiguous, the inten-
tion of the Legislature can be considered without objection. In
determining that intention, the courts should consider: the finan-
cial situation of the state at the time of enactment; 10 the former
act which determined the capital gains taxable amount, according
to the United States Internal Revenue Code;" and the result of a
literal interpretation which causes a taxable amount to result only
when the sale price is at least twice the taxpayer's base.'
2
The Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act offers one final
guide to the courts in determining legislative intent:
In ascertaining the intention of the Legislature in the
enactment of a law, the courts may be guided by the fol-
lowing presumptions among others:
(1) That the Legislature does not intend a result that
is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable .... 13
It is absurd that a gain on the exchange of property should be
taxed only to the extent that such gain exceeds the taxpayer's
base. This fact, coupled with the previously indicated considera-
tions in ascertaining legislative intent, gives the court freedom to
find that the taxable amount resultant from a sale or exchange of
property is the net gain therefrom.
14
9. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
10. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
11. The former Pennsylvania personal income tax act stated the
act would be effectuated "by utilizing and uniformly applying in this
article those terms, definitions, classifications and other provisions of the
Federal Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, as they relate to the
Federal Income Tax on Individuals .... ." Act of March 4, 1971, ACT.
No. 2, P.N. 560, § 301 declared unconstitutional by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Amidon v. Kane, 444 Pa. 38, 279 A.2d 53 (1971).
12. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 555 (1969).
14. See note 5 and accompanying text supra. In the regulations
promulgated to administer collection of the tax the Pennsylvania De-
partment of Revenue has interpreted the wording under consideration
to mean the following:
Net gains or net income, less net losses, derived from the sale,
exchange or other disposition of property, including real or per-
sonal, whether tangible or intangible, to the extent that the
value of that which is received or receivable exceeds the tax-
payer's actual or attributed base as determined in accordance
with accepted accounting principles and practices.
2 PA. BULL. No. 8, p. 265 (1972) (emphasis added). The effect of this in-
terpretation is to imply that "net gain or income" is equivalent to sale
price.
III. VAGUENESS CONSMERATIONS
A. The Due Process'5 Argument
Net gain to be taxed by this statute is the excess of the sell-
ing price over "the taxpayer's actual or attributed base, as de-
termined in accordance with accepted accounting principles and
practices.""' Ordinarily, when a capital asset is purchased the base
is the cost incurred in acquisition of the property.' 7 However, if
the taxpayer acquires the property by gift his base is undeter-
mined. The base could be the base of the property to the donor
prior to the gift in addition to any gift taxes paid on the transfer.
This is the method of determination adopted by the United States
Internal Revenue Code.'8 An equally logical base would be the
fair market value of the property at the time of transfer. As a
result of this statutory ambiguity the taxpayer, upon a subsequent
sale of property acquired by gift, may pay tax on an amount sub-
sequently determined incorrect by the Pennsylvania Department
of Revenue. If the taxpayer chose too high a base insufficient
tax would result and a tax deficiency would be assessed. Addi-
tionally, an interest penalty on the deficiency will be imposed.' 9
As a result of ambiguity in the statute the taxpayer's property has
been taken without due process of law. This result occurs since
the taxpayer was required to pay an interest penalty as a result of
an unclear taxation clause.
The Pennsylvania courts could take the position that the
United States Internal Revenue Code, in effect for sixty years,
20
15. The fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United
States indicates in part: "nor shall any State deprive any person of ...
property, without due process of law. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
16. Act of August 31, 1971, ACT No. 93, § 303 (3), P.N. 1786.
17. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1012.
18. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 1015(a), (d) (1) (a).
19. Interest is due on any payment of tax due and not timely paid.
Such payment is calculated as follows:
If any amount of tax imposed by this article is not paid on or
before the last date prescribed for payment, interest on such
amount at the rate of one-half per cent per month for each month
or fraction thereof from such date, shall be paid for the period
from such last date to the date paid.
Act of August 31, 1971, ACT No. 93, § 351, P.N. 1786.
20. The present United States Internal Revenue Code has been in
effect since 1954. The previous code was adopted in 1939. Prior to that
date a new code was enacted every other year. The original code was
enacted in 1913.
Adoption of the United States Internal Revenue Code to define base
creates a substantive law delegation of power issue. The Pennsylvania
Legislature, and that body alone, is empowered by the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution to legislate. See note 29 and accompanying text infra. Per-
mitting the United States Congress to dictate what base shall be for
Pennsylvania personal income tax purposes would amount to an unlawful
delegation of legislative powers by the Pennsylvania Legislature. See
notes 30-40 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of why the




has acquired the status of "basic accounting practice." If this law
is used to define base for Pennsylvania income tax purposes, the
above issue of ambiguity would be resolved. However, if this ap-
proach is taken another problem arises. For federal purposes, the
basis is reduced by depreciation or depletion taken prior to sale
or exchange. 21 The sound reasoning for this reduction is that
such depreciation or depletion, when taken, is an expense used to
reduce taxable income.22 The deduction is permitted since it
recognizes a decline in the value of the property. Therefore, re-
duction in the basis merely recognizes this decline in the value
for purposes of determining the taxable gain upon a sale of the
property.
It does not seem equitable that such depreciation should re-
duce the taxpayer's base for Pennsylvania purposes since the indi-
vidual did not have the benefit of the depreciation expense to re-
duce his tax in prior years. Thus, if the United States Internal
Revenue Code is adopted as a basic accounting practice, which
would eliminate the ambiguity currently surrounding the defini-
tion of base, it seems the due process problem would remain.23
It is submitted that requiring the Pennsylvania taxpayer to re-
duce his base for depreciation without permitting him to take like
amounts as expenses against his taxable income results in a taking
of property without due process of law.
This depreciation problem also raises the issue of denial of
equal protection under the law. 24 Taxpayers deriving income
from depreciable capital assets are not being treated equally with
persons who derive their income from other sources. Taxpayers
who derive income from capital asset sales are also not being
treated equally. For example, if one taxpayer holds a non-de-
preciable capital asset, an asset not used in a business, his base is
his cost. If another taxpayer holds a depreciable capital asset, an
21. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1016 (A) (2).
22. INT. RE. CODE of 1954, § 167.
23. This is the result since the taxpayer never had the opportunity
to reduce Pennsylvania taxable income by depreciation expense. Yet he
is required to decrease his base by such depreciation, thus increasing his
taxable gain on the sale of the property. The Pennsylvania Department of
Revenue in its Rules and Regulations points out:
The base shall be increased by capital expenditures made after the
property was acquired and decreased by depreciation or amorti-
zation after the property was acquired.
2 PA. BULL., No. 8, p. 265 (1972).
24. The Constitution of the United States provides that "[n]o state
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
asset used in a business, his base is his cost less depreciation
taken for federal income tax purposes.2 5 Thus, the cost and sell-
ing price of the two assets could be the same and yet the latter
taxpayer would be required to show a greater net gain for Penn-
sylvania income tax purposes and his tax would be correspond-
ingly greater. This problem of unequal treatment can also arise
where two taxpayers sell homes. If one rents a portion of his
home he can therefore depreciate that portion, whereas the other
who does not rent cannot depreciate. Although neither took de-
preciation for Pennsylvania income tax purposes, even if both
bought and sold at the same times and for the same prices, one
will be required to pay more Pennsylvania income tax.
If the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue had elected not
to require a reduction of basis for depreciation taken prior to
enactment of the personal income tax the above issue would be re-
solved. However, the opposite position has been taken. In the
rules and regulations issued by the Department of Revenue, Section
303(a) (3)-2 states that the base shall be reduced by depreciation. 2
B. The Unlawful Delegation of Legislative Authority
The question of vagueness creates a further constitutional con-
sideration. The Pennsylvania Constitution declares: "The legisla-
tive power of this Commonwealth shall be vested in the General
Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Repre-
sentatives. 217 A delegation of this power to legislate by the Gen-
eral Assembly is unconstitutional. There is, however, a distinction
between legislation and administration recognized by the courts.
In Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority the distinction was pre-
sented:
While the legislature cannot delegate power to make
a law, it may, where necessary, confer authority and dis-
cretion in connection with the execution of the law, it may
establish primary standards and impose upon others the
duty to carry out the declared legislative policy of the
act.
28
The difficulty arises in determining when the legislature has
merely delegated administrative responsibility as opposed to cir-
cumstances in which the power to legislate has been delegated.
The Belovsky case notes that "primary standards" must be set by
the legislature. Regarding the question of how specific the leg-
islature must be, in United States v. Deltra Flag Co. the Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held:
25. See note 23 supra which states that the Pennsylvania Department
of Revenue requires base to be reduced by depreciation for Pennsylvania
income tax purnoses.
26. 2 PA. BULL., No. 8, p. 265 (1972).
27. PA. CONST., art. 11, § 1.
28. 357 Pa. 329, 342, 54 A.2d 277, 284 (1947).
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Congress must establish definite standards to be fol-
lowed and policies to be effectuated. . . . Within these
standards the administrator may exercise his discretion
in the application and enforcement of the statute to carry
out its purpose. Congress may not delegate nor may an
administrator usurp the legislative function. Intelligent
principles and definite standards must be stated to guide,
control and limit the execution of the statute; they cannot
be left to the administrator's discretion.
29
Obtaining guidance on the delegation of power issue from United
States cases was declared permissible by the Chartiers Valley
Joint School v. County Board of School Directors case where the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that "In construing the Con-
stitution of Pennsylvania on the delegation issue, we may look to
similar cases construing the Constitution of the United States."
30
The Deltra Flag Co. case notes that permissible delegation oc-
curs when "intelligent principles and definite standards" are stated
"to guide, control and limit the execution of the statute."'31 Has
the Pennsylvania statute taxing capital gains met these require-
ments? The Pennsylvania act taxes "net gains . . . less net
losses derived from the sale. . . of property . . . to the extent...
net gain . . .exceeds the taxpayer's actual or attributed base as
determined in accordance with accepted accounting principles and
practices."3 2 Nowhere else in the act are "actual or attributed
base" defined. Nor is what constitutes a "sale" indicated. In Mur-
ray v. City of Philadelphia33 a city ordinance taxing capital gains
presented similar definitional problems. The brief for the appel-
lant in the Murray case criticized the ordinance for vagueness as
follows:
The ordinance makes no provision as to the basis to
be used in determining gain in any of the various circum-
stances by which property may be acquired. No method
is set forth to determine the basis of property received by
29. 86 F. Supp. 84, 86 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
30. 418 Pa. 520, 538, 211 A.2d 487, 497 (1965).
31. United States v. Deltra Flag Co., 86 F. Supp. 84, 86 (E.D. Pa.,
1949).
32. Act of August 31, 1971, ACT No. 93 § 303(3), P.N. 1786; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 72, § (1971).
33. 364 Pa. 157, 71 A.2d 280 (1950). The tax here was imposed on:
(c) . . . The net profits earned after January 1, 1949, of busi-
ness . . .conducted by such residents [of Philadelphia]; on (d)
The . . . net profits earned after January 1, 1949, of business
.; and (e) at the rate of one and one-quarter per/centum on all
other net income derived after January 1, 1949, from any source
whatsoever not provided for in (a), (b), (c), and (d) by persons
who reside in Philadelphia. ...
Id. at 161, 71 A.2d at 283.
gift or inheritance. No provision is made with respect to
depreciation. . . . The ordinance does not prescribe what
adjustments to the basis of property are required or per-
mitted for capital expenditures or receiptsA
4
Concerning the effect on the validity of the ordinance the court
held:
In other respects the amendment is too vague and uncer-
tain in its provisions to be enforced. . . . Where a statute
is "so vague, indefinite, and uncertain that the courts are
unable to determine, with any reasonable degree of cer-
tainty what the Legislature intended, or is so incomplete
or conflicting and inconsistent in its provisions that it
cannot be executed it will be declared inoperative."8 5
The court further considered the contention of the city that the
receiver of taxes could eliminate the vagueness by defining un-
clear terms:
The argument of the city would seem to indicate that the
respects in which the ordinance is considered to be vague
may be cured by regulations of the Receiver of Taxes.
The city council, as the agent of the state, has no au-
thority to delegate to the receiver of taxes its own legisla-
tive duties. All that the receiver can properly be asked to
do is prepare administrative regulations. 6
If the Pennsylvania Income Tax statute is found to be vague,
therefore, it cannot be saved simply by permitting the Department
of Revenue to alleviate the ambiguity by regulations. Section 338
of the Act gives the Department of Revenue the following power:
The Department is authorized and required to make the
inquiries, determinations and assessments of all taxes im-
posed by this article.
(b) If the mode or time for the assessment of any tax is
not otherwise provided for, the department may establish
the same by regulations.
37
However, this section does not permit the Department of Revenue
to define base, to determine what sales are taxable, or to decide
whether or not depreciation or depletion reduce the base. These
determinations decide what are taxable events and taxable
amounts-both legislative acts. It would be an improper delega-
tion of legislative authority to permit the Department to make
these determinations.
The one distinction between the ordinance in the Murray case
and the Pennsylvania income tax capital gains section is that in
the latter all seemingly vague terms are to be defined by "accepted
34. Brief for Appellant, Murray v. City of Philadelphia, 364 Pa. 157,
71 A.2d 280 (1950) quoted by the court at 177-78, 71 A.2d at 290.
35. Murray v. City of Philadelphia, 364 Pa. 157, 178, 71 A.2d 280,
290 (1950).
36. Id.
37. Act of August 31 1971, ACT No. 93, § 338(a) (6), P.N. 1786.
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accounting principles and practices." 8  But the phrase "accepted
accounting principles and practices" is itself vague. As noted ear-
lier when examining the appropriateness of applying the deprecia-
tion methods sanctioned by the Internal Revenue Code,3 9 not
even that long established procedure can be applied for the pur-
poses of determining gain on sale of property for Pennsylvania in-
come tax purposes.
IV. THE NARROW RETROACTIVrrY ISSUE
The Pennsylvania personal income tax was passed on August
31, 1971 but made retroactive to June 1, 1971.40 The courts have
generally upheld such limited retroactivity. 41 As the Supreme
Court held in Milliken v. United States,
a tax is not necessarily and certainly arbitrary and there-
fore invalid because retroactively applied, and taxing acts
having retroactive features have been upheld in view of
the particular circumstances disclosed and considered by
the Court .... 42
The courts permit such retroactive taxes primarily because they
are necessary for the functioning of government. In Welch v.
Henry the Court responded to a contention that a retroactive tax
is void as follows:
The equitable distribution of the costs of government
through the medium of an income tax is a delicate and
difficult task. In its performance experience has shown
the importance of reasonable opportunity for the legisla-
38. Act of August 31, 1971, ACT No. 93, § 303(3), P.N. 1786.
39. See notes 20-26 and accompanying text supra.
40. Act of August 31, 1971, ACT No. 93, § 301(v), P.N. 1786.
41. See Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938); Brushaber v. Union
Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1915); Commonwealth v. Budd, 379 Pa. 159, 105
A.2d 563 (1954). The Brushaber case held the federal income tax act,
which was enacted October 3, 1913 but made retroactive to March 1, 1913,
valid in spite of limited retroactivity.
42. 283 U.S. 15, 21 (1931). In one respect this case is unique on
the question of limited retroactivity. The case involves a gift made in
1916 prior to enactment of the gift tax in 1918. The Supreme Court held
the tax retroactively applicable. This is the only instance in which the
United States Supreme Court has wavered from its strict position that
gift taxes are not to be retroactively applied. The position seems based
on the fact that the 1918 United States Gift and Estate Tax Act first rec-
ognized gifts made in contemplation of death. The court found that this
case involved an attempted avoidance of estate tax. Technically, the gift
was not taxed. Rather, estate tax was imposed on the amount of the gift.
It should additionally be noted that when Congress passed a subsequent
gift tax in 1932 the tax was made specifically applicable "to a transfer
made on or before the date of the enactment of this Act," Act of June 6,
1932, ch. 209, Art. III, 47 Stat. 245.
tive body, in the revision of tax laws, to distribute in-
creased costs of government among the taxpayers in the
light of present need for revenue and with knowledge of
the sources and amounts of the various classes of taxable
income during the taxable period preceding revision. With-
out that opportunity accommodation of the legislative pur-
pose to the need may be seriously obstructed if not de-
feated. ... 4.1
Because of this need for immediate access to finances the
courts permit retroactivity, but only within narrow limits. Retro-
activity must not be for an extended period. This limitation on
valid retroactive taxation was noted in the Welch case:
For more than seventy-five years it has been the familiar
legislative practice of Congress in the enactment of reve-
nue laws to tax retroactively income or profits received
during the year of the session in which the taxing statute
is enacted, and in some instances during the year of the
preceding session.
44
The fact situation in the Welch case involved the retroactive tax-
ation of income earned two years prior to the enactment of the
income tax act. The Court further held that "while the present
tax may approach or reach the limit of permissible retroactivity,
it does not exceed it. ' ' 45 The Pennsylvania income tax act is retro-
active only three months, which is within the permissible limited
retroactivity guidelines set by prior case law.
4 6
A. The Distinction between Capital Gains and Ordinary Income
While retroactive taxes of a limited nature have been upheld,
several courts have noted a distinction between taxes on voluntary
as opposed to involuntary acts.47  Generally, the realization of
income from the sale of a capital asset is the result of a voluntary
action whereas income from other sources is "involuntarily" ac-
quired. This distinction is best stated in Welch v. Henry48 where
a tax was applied retroactively to the receipt of dividends. Con-
cerning the effect of such taxation upon the reasonable person,
the Court held:
We cannot assume that stockholders would refuse to re-
ceive corporate dividends even if they knew that their re-
ceipt would later be subjected to a new tax or to the in-
crease of an old one.
49
43. 305 U.s. 134, 149 (1938).
44. Id. at 148.
45. Id.
46. Act of August 31, 1971, ACT No. 93, § 301(6), P.N. 1786, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § (1971).
47. Involuntary as used in this context refers to irrational or unrea-
sonable rather than truly involuntary actions. The courts distinguish the
irrational act of refusing a dividend because of a tax imposed on it from
the decision not to "voluntarily" make a gift to someone because of similar
tax consequences.
48. 305 U.S. 134 (1938).
49. Id. at 148.
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The court permitted limited retroactivity in such a situation since
even if the taxpayer had been aware of the impending tax he
would not have rejected the dividends. This reasoning applies with
equal force to most other forms of income, such as wages, rents
and interest. It does not apply to capital gains however. The sale
of a capital asset is ordinarily a voluntary action. Forewarning
of an impending tax on capital gains income gives the taxpayer
the opportunity to elect not to sell and continue to collect the
income from such asset.50 The structure of the Pennsylvania in-
come tax act presents an additional reason for electing not to sell.
The Pennsylvania income tax act does not allow the taxpayer to
offset losses from one class of income against gains in other class-
es. 51 Thus, by electing not to sell a capital asset in one year and
realizing a taxable gain the taxpayer could sell in a later year when
he has sustained losses from the sale of other capital assets and
thus offset the gains and losses to reduce his total tax liability.
Otherwise, the gain in the initial year would be fully taxable and
the loss in the subsequent year nondeductible.
Because of this voluntary aspect, retroactive gift taxes have
been invalidated by the United States Supreme Court, even when
the retroactivity is limited.5 2 Attempts to tax gifts retroactively
have been defeated in Untermyer v. Anderson,53 Blodgett v. Hold-
50. Most capital assets give the taxpayer a return on his investment.
When he elects to sell he has determined the profits of sale exceed the
value obtained by keeping the property. A refusal to accept wages results
in no similar return on investment. A tax imposed on the net gain re-
sulting from the sale of property would be a factor in determining
whether to retain the asset.
An additional argument against the retroactive taxation of capital
gains is the following:
1. The owner of a capital asset presumes a tax on capital gains
income is imminent.
2. The individual relies on this fact and therefore sells an income
producing asset to avoid taxation of the appreciation in value.
3. A tax on this sale is passed and made retroactive thereby
taxing this sale.
The taxpayer has been deprived of the opportunity to adjust his sale
price to reflect this tax. Also, the taxpayer was not able to consider this
tax in determining whether to retain the asset for its income producing
capacity.
51. The rules of the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue in the
income definition section state that income is:
The total of the classes enumerated under subsections (1) through
(8) of § 303(a) received by a taxpayer directly, and the
amount of each such class derived by the taxpayer through estates
or trusts. There shall be no set off between or among such
classes.
2 PA. BULL., No. 8, p. 261 (1972).
52. But see note 42 supra.
53. 276 U.S. 440 (1928).
en,5 4 and Nichols v. Coolidge.55 The reasoning of the Court is con-
sistent: One who contemplates making a gift may decide not to if
he is aware of the tax consequences.
B. The Failure to Forewarn the Taxpayer
An additional reason for the invalidation of these attempted
retroactive gift taxes was a failure to forewarn the taxpayer. In
Welch v. Henry5" the Court held retroactive gift taxes invalid
since "the nature or amount of the tax could not reasonably have
been anticipated by the taxpayer at the time of the particular vol-
untary act which the statute later made the taxable event." 57 In
Untermyer v. Anderson,5" the Court held that, although a pro-
posed bill to tax gifts was pending and a conference committee
report was available, the taxpayer was not reasonably informed.
The Court stated:
[T] he taxpayer may justly demand to know when and how
he becomes liable for taxes. He cannot foresee and ought
not to be required to guess the outcome of pending meas-
ures. The future of every bill while before Congress is
necessarily uncertain. The will of the lawmakers is not
definitely expressed until final action thereon has been
taken.5 1
This case notes that nothing less than final enactment of the act
will give adequate forewarning of a retroactive gift tax.
The Untermyer statement on retroactivity is in sharp con-
trast to that in City National Bank v. Iowa State Tax Commis-
sion. 60 The City National Bank case involved the taxation of capi-
tal gains accumulated in prior years and realized as the result of a
corporate liquidation. The Iowa Supreme Court pointed out the
following requirement of forewarning:
If the taxpayer is reasonably forewarned that such a gain
may later be taxed, the imposed tax usually will not be
found unjustly oppressive or void. .... 61
54. 275 U.S. 142 (1927).
55. 274 U.S. 531 (1927). Nichols v. Coolidge involved a succession
tax rather than a gift tax. A husband and wife set up irrevocable trusts
with remainders to their sons. After the trusts were created, but prior to
the deaths of the settlors, the state passed a succession tax. The United
States Supreme Court found the attempt to tax this succession to be "ar-
bitrary, capricious and amount (s) to confiscation." Id. at 543.
56. 305 U.S. 134 (1938).
57. Id. at 147.
58. 276 U.S. 440 (1928).
59. Id. at 445-46. See note 42 supra, which discusses a retroactive
gift tax case in which retroactivity was upheld.
60. 251 Iowa 603, 102 N.W.2d 381 (1960). In this case the taxpayer
acquired stock in 1935. In 1955 the Iowa General Assembly passed an
act imposing a tax on gains resulting from the sale or other exchange of
property. The taxpayer realized his gain as the result of a corporate
liquidation in 1956. This realization of income, therefore, was not the re-
sult of a voluntary act by the taxpayer.
61. Id. at 615, 102 N.W.2d at 387-88.
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"Reasonably forewarned" in the City National Bank case offered
little protection to the taxpayer, however, since the Court held:
[W]hile capital gains were not included as income in our
income tax law prior to January 1, 1955, yet the exclusion
was little more than an exemption, and the public should
have been aware that such exemption could be removed
at any session subsequent to the enactment of the income
tax law in 1934 .... 6
The contrast between the requirement of forewarning in the
Untermyer and City National Bank cases shows the distinction
the courts find between voluntary gift taxes and ordinary income
taxes. Capital gains usually result from voluntary actions but
even accepting the City National Bank determination of "reason-
ably forewarned" it is unlikely the Pennsylvania taxpayers were
forewarned sufficiently. Prior to March 3, 1971, there was no per-
sonal income tax on any income in Pennsylvania 3 so the City Na-
tional Bank reasoning of a mere capital gains exemption cannot
apply. The contention that the present income tax act was in dis-
cussion in the Legislature during the three-month retroactivity
period, and therefore the taxpayer was reasonably forewarned, is
disposed of by the Untermyer decision which held: "the future of
every bill while before Congress is necessarily uncertain.
' '64
There is a basic distinction between a gift tax and an income
tax. Welch v. Henry stated that this distinction exists because
no rational taxpayer would reject income simply because of tax
consequences, whereas the same rational man might decide against
giving a gift because of these same tax consequences.6 5 How-
ever, this distinction does not differentiate all forms of income
from gifts. The sale of a capital asset is generally a voluntary act.
Thus, the voluntary nature of the transaction, which distin-
guishes gifts from income also distinguishes capital gains from
other forms of income. If there was no reasonable forewarning 66
of a tax on capital gains transactions, it would seem the same rea-
soning which voids retroactive gift taxes67 should apply with equal
force to void a retroactive capital gains tax.
62. Id. at 616, 102 N.W.2d at 388.
63. See note 2 supra.
64. Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440, 446 (1928).
65. 305 U.S. 134 (1938).
66. To meet the requirement of reasonable forewarning it is neces-
sary to comply with the standard set forth in Untermyer v. Anderson,
276 U.S. 440 (1928). That standard is impossible to meet prior to enact-
ment of the tax act. See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
67. See notes 54-56 and accompanying text supra.
V. THE BROAD RETROACTIVITY ARGUMENT
For purposes of arriving at net gain on the sale or other ex-
change of property the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue has
stated that the taxpayer's base shall be the acquisition cost re-
gardless of when the asset was purchased. 68 The result of this
definition of base is that for many taxpayers the increase in prop-
erty value which is to be taxed will have occurred primarily prior
to the enactment of the tax. This raises the broader question of
whether the taxation of such capital accumulation which oc-
curred prior to the enactment of the taxing statute constitutes
retroactive taxation.
A. A Tax on Capital Accumulations Income
There are two contrary positions taken by the courts on
the issue of whether capital gains should be recognized as income
when the asset is sold. The courts which have upheld the taxa-
tion of capital gains resulting from increases in property value
prior to enactment of an income tax dispose of the retroactivity
issue by finding that the tax is imposed on the receipt of income
which arises after the sale or exchange. 9 These cases reason that
since the sale occurs after the enactment, the tax is not retroac-
tive. Prior to such sale, these courts argue, there was no in-
come, only accumulated capital. The tax is imposed only on the
income which is received after the tax is passed, which does not
constitute retroactive taxation. In City National Bank v. Iowa
State Tax Commission, on the issue of such retroactivity, the court
concluded:
Obviously if these authorities are applicable here, (citing
cases) and if we agree with those conclusions that in-
come is not realized until a capital asset is sold we must
hold that such taxing act is not retroactive, that unrealized
capital gains are not separate property, and that until the
gain or profit is taken, there is no taxable income. A
holding that the law taxes the profit as such when it is
taken would avoid a decision invalidating this legislation,
upon the grounds that it is an illegal retroactive tax. It
68. This is pointed out in the rules adopted by the Pennsylvania
Department of Revenue.
In the case of property acquired by a taxpayer by inheritance,
the base shall be the fair market value at the date of death.
Otherwise, the base shall be cost.
2 PA. BULL., No. 8, p. 265 (1972).
69. See Helvering v. Canfield, 291 U.S. 163 (1934); MacLaughlin v.
Alliance Ins. Co., 286 U.S. 244 (1932); Fullerton Oil Co. v. Johnson, 2 Cal.
2d 162, 39 P.2d 796 (1934); Norman v. Bradley, 173 Ga. 482, 160 S.E. 413
(1931); City National Bank v. Iowa State Tax Comm'n., 251 Iowa 603,
102 N.W.2d 381 (1960); Fidelity and Columbia Trust Co. v. Reeves,
287 Ky. 522, 154 S.W.2d 337 (1941); Olvey v. Collector of Revenue, 233
La. 985, 99 So. 2d 317 (1958); Fernwood Lumber Co. v. Mississippi State
Tax Comm'n, 167 Miss. 273, 149 So. 723 (1933).
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is, of course, our duty to adopt such a view if the same
can be reasonably justified. .... 70
A similar position was taken by the Louisiana Supreme Court
in Olvey v. Collector of Revenue.71 In Olvey the tax statute be-
came effective in 1934 and provided that for determining capital
gains the basis of property acquired before that date would be
the fair market value on the date of enactment. The taxpayer
who had moved into Louisiana in 1937 and sold stock in 1952
contended that his basis should have been determined when he en-
tered the state, rather than in 1934. In answer to this contention
the court held:
It would appear to us that the legislature could adopt
any reasonable basis for determining net gain. The year
to year increase in the value of the stock is not taxable,
it is the sale of stock that brings into play the taxable
event.
7 2
Other courts have held that a tax which seeks to reach an in-
crease in the value of the property which accrued prior to en-
actment of a tax act does constitute retroactive taxation. The
United States Supreme Court took this position in Lynch v. Tur-
rish.73 In this case Turrish sold stock which had doubled in value
70. 251 Iowa 603, 613, 102 N.W.2d 381, 386 (1960).
71. 233 La. 985, 99 So. 2d 317 (1958).
72. Id. at 991, 99 So. 2d at 319.
73. 247 U.S. 221 (1918). In the Turrish case the taxpayer held
property which had increased in value prior to enactment of the federal
income tax. The United States Supreme Court held that Congress had no
right to tax the capital gains.
In Southern Pacific Company v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918) the Court
made a similar finding. In this case one corporation owned all the stock
of another company. The wholly owned company paid dividends subse-
quent to the income tax act out of capital accumulation derived prior to
the enactment. In concluding that such dividends were not taxable the
Court stated:
We must reject . . the broad contention submitted in be-
half of the Government that all receipts-everything that comes
in-are income within the proper definition of the term "gross in-
come," and that the entire proceeds of a conversion of capital
assets, in whatever form and under whatever circumstances ac-
complished, should be treated as gross income .... [W]e are
bound to consider accumulations that accrued to a corporation
prior to January 1, 1913, as being capital, not income, for the
purposes of the act.
Id. at 335.
However, the Court seems to have reversed itself in Lynch v. Hornby,
247 U.S.. 339 (1918). In that case the Court held fully taxable dividends
paid to a stockholder subsequent to the effective date of the income tax act.
These dividends were paid entirely out of capital accumulations which
arose prior to the tax. Hornby is distinguishable from both Turrish and
Southern, however, since in the latter two cases the potential taxpayer
owned the property which had appreciated prior to the enactment of the
since the date of purchase and prior to the effective date of the
federal income tax. Concerning taxation of this increase the
Court held:
If increases in the value of the lands was income, it had
its particular time and such time must have been within
the time of the law to be subject to the law, that is, it
must have been after March 13, 1913. .... 74
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Nygaard, where similar
facts were present, found:
Upon these facts the court now reaches the conclusion
that there is in fact no "income" in the present case within
the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution.
• . . The word "income" has a definite, well understood
meaning. No attempt was made to define it in the consti-
tutional amendment for the reason that it carried its mean-
ing with it. . . . In brief, it may be said to be the profit
or gain derived from capital or labor or from both com-
bined. .... 75
This case has been severely criticized however, since such a nar-
row definition of income prevents not only taxation of gains re-
sultant from appreciations in the value of assets prior to enact-
ment of the tax, but also prevents taxation of similar apprecia-
tions after enactment of the tax. This consequence of the Ny-
gaard court reasoning was noted and criticized by the California
Supreme Court in Fullerton Oil Co. v. Johnson:
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that increases in
value of capital assets occurring prior to the effective date
of the taxing act cannot be taxed as income; that such in-
creases in value are capital and not income; that such
additions cannot be made into income by legislative man-
date. The difficulty with this reasoning is that it proceeds
upon a misconception of what is actually taxed. As al-
ready pointed out, it is realized gain that is taxed, and
that is only in the year of its realization. The reasoning
of the Wisconsin court would equally apply to capital gains
accruing over a number of years subsequent to the pas-
sage of the taxing act and realized later. 76
In Norman v. Bradley77 which allowed taxation of accumu-
income tax. The payments to Hornby were in no sense canital to him.
These payments were solely income. In both Turrish and Southern the
payments were of capital assets which the taxoayer himself held. The
Pennsylvania taxpayer holds the property, which has appreciated in value
prior to the enactment of the tax, in the same manner as the taxpayers
in the Turrish and Southern cases held the pronerty taxed.
74. Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U.S. 221 at 229 (1918). In considering the
position taken by the United States Sunreme Court on this issue of retro-
active taxation it must be remembered that the federal government was
prohibited from levying income taxes without apportionment among the
states prior to enactment at the sixteenth amendment on February 25,
1913.
75. 163 Wis. 307, 309-10, 158 N.W. 87, 88 (1916).
76. 2 Cal. 2d 162, 172, 39 P.2d 796, 800 (1934).
77. 173 Ga. 482, 160 S.E. 413 (1931).
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lated capital appreciation Justice Gilbert of the Georgia Supreme
Court in dissent took a position similar to that taken in the Ny-
gaard case. It is Justice Gilbert's contention that
to construe the law as urged by the tax commissioner in
this case would give to the Georgia income tax act a con-
struction not intended by the General Assembly. It would
tax capital or property as income, which cannot be
made income by legislative act or construction. . . . It
would bring the act in conflict with the due process clause
of the United States Constitution.
7 8
The Illinois Supreme Court in Thorpe v. Mahin79 interpreted
the Illinois tax act, which is fundamentally identical to the Penn-
sylvania act, in a manner preventing the taxation of capital accum-
ulations which arose prior to the effective date of the tax. The
Illinois Supreme Court determined that in instances in which
capital assets have increased in value prior to the effective date of
the tax, such assets must be given a base eqiuvalent to their
fair market value on the effective date. To have decided other-
wise, the court held, would have placed the act in serious jeopardy.
B. Statutory Considerations
In the Thorpe case the statute under consideration was silent
concerning the valuation date for capital assets. The court re-
jected a contention that base value should be the date of acqui-
sition and adopted the effective date of the act for such valua-
tion. The determination was based on two rules of statutory
construction: First, that no statute should be considered retroac-
tive unless the legislative intent is clear; 0 second, the courts
should interpret a statute to promote its essential purpose and
avoid a construction which might bring into question the statute's
validity.8 ' The Illinois Supreme Court held the legislative intent
was not clearly expressed:
78. Id. at 495, 160 S.E. at 419 (dissenting opinion).
79. 43 Ill. 2d 36, 250 N.E.2d 633 (1969).
80. The Illinois Supreme Court declared: "First we have the famil-
iar rule that statutes will not be considered retroactively unless it clearly
appears such was the legislative intention. . . ." Id. at 50, 250 N.E.2d at
640. The argument against the retroactive application of statutes is sup-
ported in People v. Graves, 280 N.Y. 405, 20 N.E.2d 371 (1939):
While it is true that not all retroactive statutes are void, nev-
ertheless, it is a fundamental rule of construction that retroactive
operation of statutes is not favored by courts and will not be
given such construction unless the language expressly or by neces-
sary implication requires it. . ..
Id. at 409, 20 N.E.2d at 372. Accord, Commonwealth v. Repplier Coal Co.,
348 Pa. 372, 35 A.2d 319 (1944).
81. Thorpe v. Mahin, 43 Ill. 2d 36, 51, 250 N.E.2d 633, 641 (1969).
The Act is clear, indeed it expressly provides, that the
tax shall operate prospectively beginning August 1, 1969.
The Act does not state, however, whether the basis for de-
termining gain or loss from the sale or exchange of a cap-
ital asset purchased or acquired prior to August 1, 1969,
should be its August 1, 1969 value, or its date of acquisi-
tion value .... 82
Where an act is ambiguous regarding retroactivity, the court ar-
gued, it should not be interpreted retroactively.
A Northwestern University Law Review case analysis83 con-
tends that the conclusion of the court in Thorpe was erroneous.
The basis for this contention is that the intention of the Legisla-
ture on the valuation question was clearly expressed through two
occurrences and should have been recognized by the court. First,
statements by one of the main proponents of the tax before the
Illinois Senate Public Finance Committee expressed a desire that
valuation of capital assets be as of the acquisition date. 4 Second,
a proposed amendment to the Illinois income tax act limiting the
valuation of capital assets to the effective date of the act was de-
feated.8 5 The Illinois Supreme Court did not indicate whether
these circumstances were considered in determining legislative
intent where the Act was silent.
The Pennsylvania income tax section is very similar to that
of the Illinois income tax act. In both statutes the tax is imposed
on income received subsequent to a specified date. In neither act
is a date specified for property valuation for capital gains tax
purposes. One distinction between the two acts is that the Illi-
nois act is based on the United States Internal Revenue Code. Since
the valuation date for federal purposes is March 1, 1913, it might
This requirement that the courts interpret a statute so as to uphold its
validity is enforced by the holding in Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142
(1927):
Upon this among other considerations the rule is settled that as
between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which
it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain
duty is to adopt that which will save the Act. Even to avoid a
serious doubt the rule is the same....
Id. at 148.
82. Thorpe v. Mahin, 43 Ill. 2d 36, 50, 250 N.E.2d 633, 640 (1969).
83. ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT REVIEW-TXATION, 64 Nw. U.L. REV.
886 (1969).
84. Mr. Charles W. Davis, one of the principal draftsmen of the Illi-
nois Income Tax Act, in testimony before the Illinois Senate Public Finance
Committee stated:
Some states have tried to modify this result (taxation of
property appreciation arising before tax enactment) in part by
providing that, for the purposes of determining gains or losses, the
basis of property shall be its fair market value on the effective
date of the Act .... However, we believe that this is neither
satisfactory nor necessary ....
ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT REVIEW-TAxATION, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 886, 890
(1969).
85. Id. at 891.
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be argued that by implication this date applies to valuation for
Illinois tax purposes. Since the Pennsylvania act is not based on
the federal act80 no such argument-by-implication exists. A fur-
ther distinction between the two situations, also in favor of the
Pennsylvania taxpayers who may seek to establish valuation on
the effective date of the act, is that there is no indication of con-
trary legislative intent in Pennsylvania as there was in Illinois.8 7
Committee reports on the income tax act in Pennsylvania were
not maintained, and comments on the floor of the Legislature
did not pertain to the valuation issue.
The statutory basis for the Illinois Supreme Court decision
also exists in Pennsylvania. Where alternative constructions are
available, the Statutory Construction Act of Pennsylvania re-
quires the court, in making its selection, to uphold the basic prem-
ise "that the Legislature does not intend to violate the Constitu-
tion of the United States or of this Commonwealth .... "88 There
is also a presumption against the retroactive effect of statutes:
"No law shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and
manifestly so intended by the Legislature."8 9 If the Thorpe deci-
sion represents a proper determination of this issue, it would seem
that the Illinois Court's reasoning should apply even more strongly
in Pennsylvania.
Another statutory argument favoring only prospective taxa-
tion is that where doubt exists as to the construction of a tax
act, the act should be construed in favor of the taxpayer.90 Un-
questionably, doubt exists as to the determination of basis in the
Pennsylvania income tax act, and the act itself does not address
the problem. However, this principle of statutory construction is
86. The attempt to base the Pennsylvania income tax on Federal
taxable income was declared unconstitutional in Amidon v. Kane, 444 Pa.
38 (1971).
87. See notes 84-85 and accompanying text supra.
88. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 555 (1937). See note 81 supra.
89. Id. at § 556. See note 80 supra.
90. This rule of construction is presented in Hassett v. Welch, 303
U.S. 303 (1938):
In view of other settled rules of statutory construction,
which teach that a law is presumed, in the absence of clear ex-
pression to the contrary, to operate prospectively; that, if doubt
exists as to the construction of a taxing statute, the doubt should
be resolved in favor of the taxpayer. ...
Id. at 314.
Accord, United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179 (1923); Ellis v. United
States, 416 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1969); Grays Harbor Chair v. United States,
265 F. Supp. 254 (W.D. Wash. 1967); Kern v. United States, 264 F. Supp.
952 (W.D. Wis. 1966).
sometimes forsaken by the courts where other interests override
those of the taxpayer. This occurred in Fidelity and Columbia
Trust Co. v. Reeves9 ' where the Kentucky Supreme Court stated:
Counsel contends that taxing statutes, where doubt
exists, are to be construed favorably to the taxpayer.
There is another rule upon which the safety of our gov-
ernment and its institutions depend in a considerable de-
gree. We must presume in favor of the validity of a law,
until its violation of the constitution is proved beyond
reasonable doubt .... 92
Proper consideration of this court's finding that taxing statutes
are not necessarily construed in favor of the taxpayer requires
examination of the circumstances in the Fidelity and Columbia
Trust Co. case. A tax was passed on May 8, 1936, taxing any
gain resulting from sales of property held less than two years.
The taxpayer who challenged the act had acquired property in
1935 and sold it in 1936. He argued that since his gain which the
act sought to tax represented appreciation which occurred prior to
enactment of the tax it should be tax exempt. The court's com-
ment seems based primarily on the constitutionality of the limited
retroactivity of the act 93 and does not really renounce the basic
premise that ambiguous statues should be construed in the tax-
payer's favor. The Pennsylvania courts will not be faced with a
situation analogous to that in the Fidelity and Columbia Trust
Co. case since the Pennsylvania statute is ambiguous and the retro-
activity is of a long-term nature.
There is one major distinction between the cases upholding
the taxation of gains derived from capital accumulations prior to
enactment of the tax and the Thorpe case, which denied the right
to tax such gains. Taxing statutes construed in cases permitting
retroactive taxation all designated specific valuation dates
9 4
91. 287 Ky. 522, 154 S.W.2d 337 (1941).
92. Id. at 535, 154 S.W.2d at 343.
93. See note 41 supra.
94. In the Olvey, City National, Fernwood Lumber, Fullerton Oil,
MacLaughlin and Canfield cases the acts all specified a valuation date for
capital assets. In the Fidelity and Columbia Trust Co. case the tax was
imposed only on assets held less than two years, so the issue of long term
retroactivity was not presented. Norman v. Bradley, 173 Ga. 482, 160
S.E. 413 (1931), is the only decision upholding retroactive taxation where
the relevant act was silent as to a valuation date. The Norman court
found that reference to the United States Internal Revenue Code by the
Georgia act created sufficient implication for the court to select a March 1,
1913 valuation date. The Illinois Supreme Court in Thorpe v. Mahin,
43 Ill. 2d 36, 250 N.E.2d 633 (1969), found such implication too vague to
control the valuation question.
Thus, in the only two cases which considered the valuation issue in
circumstances similar to those in Pennsylvania the courts reached opposite
conclusions as to whether an unstated valuation date will permit taxation
of prior accumulations of capital. However, in both cases there was the
possibility of electing by implication the federal valuation date. No such
possibility exists in Pennsylvania. The position taken by the Department
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whereas the Illinois act is silent on the question of valuation. The
acts where retroactivity was upheld limited such retroactivity.
The Illinois and the Pennsylvania acts place no limitation on the
degree of retroactivityAt This failure to limit evidences a failure
of the legislature to express its intent and creates a strong con-
stitutional basis for invalidating the acts. In this circumstance
the Pennsylvania courts should follow the Illinois Supreme Court
and adopt the statutory interpretation which protects validity.9 6
VI. OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS
Other constitutional attacks on a taxing statute based on ret-
roactivity are quite limited. Only in instances in which a taxing
act involves "arbitrary retroactivity" 97 is the act placed in jeop-
ardy. What constitutes such "arbitrary retroactivity" is nowhere
adequately defined. The constitutional attack on the statutes
based on "arbitrary retroactivity" is founded in "the vague con-
tours of the Fifth Amendment." 8  The real issue consists of de-
termining whether "the act complained of was so arbitrary as to
constrain to the conclusion that it was not the exertion of taxa-
tion but a confiscation of property, that is, a taxing of the same in
violation of the Fifth Amendment."99
A finding of arbitrary taxation sufficient to show that a statute
is unconstitutional requires a determination that the act would
place undue hardship on the taxpayer. Mr. Justice Brandeis pre-
sented this requirement in his dissent in Untermyer v. Anderson:
The need of the Government for revenue has hitherto
been deemed a sufficient justification for making a tax
measure retroactive whenever the imposition seemed con-
sonant with justice and the conditions were not such as
would ordinarily involve hardship. 100
As a general rule, retroactivity has been held not to yield any
such hardship and thus is not unconstitutional. In Welch v. Henry
the Court stated: "[A] tax is not necessarily unconstitutional be-
of Revenue in Pennsylvania is thus weaker than the one defeated in
Illinois but accepted in Georgia.
95. It is arguable the Illinois Legislature limited valuation, by im-
plication, to March 1, 1913 since the Illinois income tax is based on the
United States Internal Revenue Code which has a March 1, 1913 valuation
date. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
96. See notes 88-89 and accompanying text supra.
97. See note 99 and accompanying text infra.
98. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 568 (1923) (Holmes,
J., dissenting opinion).
99. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 24 (1915).
100. 276 U.S. 440, 449 (1923) (dissenting opinion).
cause retroactive. ,o"0 The Court went on to state that "[ifn
each case it is necessary to consider the nature of the tax and
the circumstances in which it is laid before it can be said that its
retroactive application is so harsh and oppressive as to transgress
the constitutional limitation. '10 2 Finally, the Court held: "While
the present tax may approach or reach the limit of permissible
retroactivity, it does not exceed it."0a Since the tax considered
in Welch involved retroactivity of two years, the decision sub-
stantiates the argument that greater retroactivity would be in-
valid.
Pennsylvania's taxation of capital gains involves basically un-
limited retroactivity. 10 4  As indicated by the Welch decision,
whether a retroactive tax amounts to "arbitrary retroactivity" is
in large measure determined by the extent of such retroactivity.
Certainly a "statute purporting to tax may be so arbitrary and
capricious as to amount to confiscation and offend the Fifth
Amendment .... -1o5 In Commonwealth v. Budd'0 6 the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court offered some guidance on the question of
when a tax statute is "arbitrary and capricious":
It is obvious, however, that there must be some limitation
on the right of a legislative body to pass laws imposing
taxes retroactively, for otherwise a legislature could con-
stitutionally impose new or increased taxes retroactively
for a period of 25 or 50 years which would be so onerous
or confiscatory and unjust as to bankrupt the individuals
or corporations thus taxed .... 107
The taxation of capital appreciation prior to enactment of the
Pennsylvania personal income tax will involve retroactivity of
"25 or 50 years" condemned by the Budd court.
A constitutional argument for the state is that income, not cap-
ital, is being taxed and therefore there is no retroactivity.10 8 An
extension of this argument is that if capital appreciation after en-
actment of the income tax is constitutionally taxable 25 or 50
years after it arises, there is no constitutional bar to similar tax-
101. 305 U.S. 134, 146 (1938).
102. Id. at 147.
103. Id. at 148.
104. See note 94 supra for a comparison of Pennsylvania's treatment
of capital gains with that of other states. See also note 14 which indicates
the means of treating capital gains adopted by the Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Revenue.
105. Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 542 (1927).
106. 79 Pa. 159, 108 A.2d 563 (1954).
107. Id. at 171, 108 A.2d at 568. A similar position is taken in
People v. Graves, 280 N.Y. 405, 21 N.E.2d 371 (1939):
Taxing statutes which by their terms were retroactive for
short periods have been held to be valid. No case has ever held
such a statute to be valid which attempted to permit a retroactive
assessment of a tax for as long a period as sixteen years.
Id. at 409, 21 N.E..2d at 372.
108. See notes 68-71 and accompanying text supr&.
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ation of appreciations accruing prior to enactment and subse-
quently realized. This reasoning is evidenced by the following
comment of the California Supreme Court in Fullerton Oil Co. v.
Johnson:
Respondent Concedes that accretions to capital accruing
after the passage of the act can be properly taxed as in-
come in the year of their fruition, but contends that ac-
cretions to value prior to the date of the taxing act cannot
be so taxed. We can see no constitutional difference be-
tween accretions to capital prior to the date of the taxing
statute and those accruing subsequent thereto. If increases
in the value of property constitute income in the year in
which realized rather than in the years when such increases
in value accrue, it would seem that constitutionally speak-
ing it makes no difference when such increases in value
accrue-whether before or after the effective date of the
taxing statute.109
Since the argument that any tax is unconstitutional because
of its retroactive effect is based on a finding that such tax is
"harsh and oppressive,"' 10 "a confiscation of property,"'" "oner-
ous,' "1 2 or involves "arbitrary retroactivity," 1"1 "constitutionally
speaking" it does make a difference when such increases in value
are realized. When one holds property and is aware that in-
creases in the value will be taxed when he sells that asset there
is no hardship 14 and the tax is therefore not harsh and oppres-
sive. Knowing the consequences, the individual can decide not to
sell the property or can sell fully aware of the tax consequences.
The taxpayer who held property prior to enactment of the income
tax and who sold unaware of the tax consequence, either because
the act was not yet passed or because he was unaware of the defi-
nition attached to basis by the Department of Revenue, suffers a
hardship and the tax is harsh and oppressive. The constitutional-
ity of all retroactive taxes is related to the limit of retroactivity.
The Pennsylvania capital gains tax is unlimited in effect and
therefore should be declared unconstitutional.
VII. WHAT ARE THE TAXPAYER'S CHANCES?
The patent ambiguity in the act, which implies that there
will be a net taxable gain from the sale or other exchange of
109. 2 Cal. 2d 162, 168-69, 39 P.2d 796, 798 (1934).
110. Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938).
111. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 24 (1915).
112. Commonwealth v. Budd, 79 Pa. 159, 171, 108 A.2d 563, 568 (1954).
113. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 24 (1915).
114. See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
property only in instances in which sale price is more than twice
the taxpayer's base,1 15 will probably receive little consideration by
the courts. The result permitted by this patent ambiguity is so
obviously not the intent of the Legislature' 16 that the courts will
not uphold it although it represents a literal interpretation of the
statute.
The vagueness problems present a difficult issue for the courts.
Since "base" is undefined by the act, the issue cannot be avoided.
"Accepted accounting principles and practices" defines base if the
United States Internal Revenue Code constitutes "accepted account-
ing practice." If the courts resolve the vagueness issue in this
manner, then the fourteenth amendment problem of taking prop-
erty without due process of law arises.1 7 This occurs since base
as defined in the Internal Revenue Code is reduced by deprecia-
tion taken. Requiring a reduction in base, for Pennsylvania in-
come tax purposes, for depreciation taken, amounts to taking
property without due process of law since no related expense
for this depreciation was ever used to offset income. The statu-
tory section permitting the Department of Revenue to administer
the act does not empower that department to define base since
this would amount to a legislative act. ' The Legislature cannot
constitutionally delegate such power. The court may be forced
to invalidate the capital gains section of the Pennsylvania income
tax act because of the vagueness involved.
The analogy between sales of capital assets and gifts presents
a strong argument that Pennsylvania cannot tax capital gains
arising from sales before August 31, 1971, the date the act was
approved by the Governor. Retroactive gift taxes are invalid
because the act taxed is voluntary. Sales of capital assets are also
voluntary. Although the courts hold that gifts can be retroac-
tively taxed if the taxpayer is adequately forewarned,11 9 the
requirement of forewarning is difficult for taxing authorities to
comply with because the courts set rigid requirements because
of opposition to retroactive taxation of voluntary acts. If the
analogy to gift taxes is accepted, no gains from sales of capi-
tal assets prior to August 31, 1971 will be taxable.
1 20
The final issue for the Pennsylvania courts to resolve is
whether the taxpayer's base for capital assets shall be determined
115. See notes 6-7 and accompanying text supra.
116. See notes 10-12 and accompanying text supra.
117. See notes 20-23 and accompanying text supra. An additional
problem which the depreciation issue creates is denial of equal protection
under the law. See notes 24-25 and accompanying text supra for a dis-
cussion of this problem.
118. See notes 27-39 and accompanying text supra.
119. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
120. See notes 52-67 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of
the applicability and effect of this analogy.
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at the date of acquisition or at the date of enactment of the tax.
Since the statute does not resolve this problem, it must be con-
sidered and decided by the court. In making the determination
the Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act states that the choice
made should be one which upholds the constitutionality of the
act. 12 1 The Statutory Construction Act also dictates that unless
the intention is clear a statute should not be given a retroactive
effect. 122  The Illinois Supreme Court in Thorpe v. Mahin123 de-
cided the same issue and held that base should be determined on
the effective date of the act. If the Pennsylvania court accepts
the reasoning of the Illinois Supreme Court, it should accept the
finding since all relevant factors are substantially identical.1 24
The reasoning of the Illinois Supreme Court could be rejected,
however, since several courts in considering the issue of taxing
capital appreciation prior to enactment of the act have found no
retroactivity. 1 25  They argue that the tax is on income derived
from the sale not on capital accumulations. However, regardless
of whether these increases in value are labeled capital or income
when the property is sold, there is great hardship on the unaware
taxpayer who must pay the tax. If retroactive tax acts are de-
clared unconstitutional because of their harsh, onerous and arbi-
trary result, then to require the taxpayer to use acquisition cost
as a base is unconstitutional.
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121. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 555 (1969); see text accompanying
note 88.
122. Id. at § 556; see text accompanying note 89.
123. 43 Ill. 2d 36, 250 N.E.2d 633 (1969). See notes 79-85 and ac-
companying text supra for a discussion of the Thorpe decision.
124. See notes 84-87 and accompanying text supra.
125. See note 69 supra.
126. See notes 97-114 and accompanying text supra.
